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RESUMO: O contributo mira a examinar os perfis jurídicos do “trabalho digital”, inclusivo 
do trabalho “on-demand-via-app” e do “crowdwork”, novas tipologias de trabalho na “gig-
economy” que envolvem, respetivamente, uma mão-de-obra on-demand móbil e uma mão-de-
obra on-demand virtual. O surgimento do “trabalho digital” e a “commodificação do trabalho” 
envolvida afetam não apenas as regras e os princípios do direito do trabalho “tradicional” mas até 
o conceito fundamental que o trabalho não é uma mercadoria. 
Não obstante disso, o “desafio” do “trabalho digital” pode também constituir uma ocasião 
para o desenvolvimento, mesmo a um nível interpretativo e de policy making, de esquemas 
protetivos aplicáveis a todos os seres humanos que trabalham, independentemente da natura da 
relação jurídica em virtude da qual desempenham as próprias atividades. Nessa perspetiva, o 
contributo quer verificar se é possível e útil pesquisar disposições protetivas fora do âmbito do 
direito do trabalho subordinado. A tal fim, os recentes desenvolvimentos da jurisprudência e da 
doutrina da área anglo-americana (nomeadamente, os casos relativos a Uber) serão comparados 
com a experiência, mais restritiva, dos tribunais italianos em matéria de qualificação da relação 
de emprego. 
O contributo vai depois pesquisar os possíveis remédios protetivos previstos pela disciplina 
geral dos contratos, pelas regulações do trabalho autónomo e pela disciplina dos contratos entre 
empresas caraterizadas pelo deslocamento de poder contratual. À luz dessas disciplinas alguns 
pontos críticos serão examinados, como a legitimidade da desativação do account do trabalhador 
e da clausula que permite recusar o trabalho prestado pelo “crowdworker”, sem compenso, para 
verificar se os remédios extra-laborais podem procurar alguma proteção, e, no caso afirmativo, 
até qual extensão. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Novas tipologias de trabalho. Trabalho digital. Trabalho autónomo. 
Trabalho subordinado. Proteção trabalhista 
  
ABSTRACT: The paper aims to analyse the legal aspects of “digital work”, as including 
“work on demand via app” and “crowdwork”, involving, respectively, an “on-
demand mobile workforce” and an “on-demand virtual workforce”. The breakout of digital work 
and the “commodification of labour” jeopardise, together with labour law standards, also the truly 
founding idea that labour is not a commodity. 
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Nonetheless, the “challenge” of digital work may constitute an opportunity for further 
reflections on the development of protective schemes applicable to all human beings who work, 
regardless of the legal scheme under which they carry out their activities. To verify whether it is 
useful and possible to search for some protective provisions for digital workers outside statutory 
employment law, the paper will compare the recent developments of Anglo-American literature 
and case law with the less open-minded perspective of Italian Law. 
The paper will therefore propose try to find out whether it is possible to elaborate some 
protective schemes for digital workers through the recourse to contract law and self-employed 
work regulations. Under such regulations, the paper will deal with some critical points (such as 
the possibility to refuse Amazon Mechanical Turkers’ work without payment, or to “dismiss” an 
Uber driver for low reputational rates), in order to verify whether outside labour law it is possible 
to find some protection for digital workers, and, in the affirmative, to what extent. 
 
KEY-WORDS: New type of labour relationships. Digital work. Autonomous work. 
Subordinate work. Labour protection. 
  
*** 
 
SUMMARY: Foreword: the qualification of the labour relationship as a presupposition for the 
individuation of the applicable social security provisions. – 1. Introduction: the 
“nosedive” of labour law? – 2. Qualification Issues. – 2.1. Are digital workers employees 
under Italian law? – 2.1.2. From ponies to kangaroos. “Work on demand via app” in the 
light of the Italian case law on pony expresses. – 2.1.2. When your cubicle is at home. 
“Crowdwork” in the light of the Italian decisions on call center workers. – 2.2. The 
unsatisfactory recourse to intermediate categories. – 2.3. Self-employed workers in many 
cases, unfortunately. 2.4. Mere intermediary or party to the self-employment contract? – 
3.  Self-employed work rights and their sources. – 3.1. Some consequences under private 
law. – 3.2. Towards the development of a Statute for self-employed (digital) workers. – 
4. Conclusions. 
 
Foreword: the qualification of the labour relationship as a presupposition for the 
individuation of the applicable social security provisions 
The present paper deals with the qualification of the new type of labour 
relationships emerging in the so-called gig economy (or platform economy), a scenario 
dominated by platforms like Uber, Taskrabbit, Deliveroo, AMT. Such companies 
platforms developed a business model that challenges the traditional perspective of labour 
law, as it introduces elements of rupture with the received notions of employer and 
employee. Platforms do retain an extremely significant degree on control over the “digital 
workers” performances, but, at the same time, the worker enjoys a degree of spatial and/or 
temporal flexibility that does not fit so well with the notion of subordination as developed 
in the last century. 
In some jurisdictions labour judges tried to prevent “digital workers” from falling 
into an “empty space of law” by re-qualifying their relationships with the platforms as 
employment relationships. The litigation related to the status of Uber drivers reached 
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even Brazil, with a Minas Gerais first instance judge according requalification1, and a 
second instance court overruling the first decision2. 
The problem of the qualification of the relationship as a subordinate employment 
relationship or as a provision of self-employed work is an evergreen issue for labour 
lawyers in every jurisdiction, and it does indeed have extremely relevant consequences 
with respect to the application of different social security regimes. 
Therefore, not only the qualification of the relationship has an impact on the 
degree of substantial protection that law grants to the worker, but also on the juridical 
position of the worker before social security authorities. Employees do generally enjoy 
several benefits (with respect to the payment of social contributions, which is normally 
set on the employer, as well as to unemployment benefits) that autonomous workers do 
not, on the ground of their supposed higher independence in the market. 
Qualification issues, which traditionally belong to the domain of “pure” labour 
law, are therefore crucial indeed also for social security law. In this perspective, although 
the reflections developed in this paper do not deal directly with social security issues, 
they still represent an attempt to construe a preliminary basis that may be useful also for 
further investigations in the field of social security law. 
1. Introduction: the “nosedive” of labour law? 
Nosedive, the first episode of the third season of the British series Black Mirror, 
released worldwide on Netflix in October 2016, depicts a dystopian reality where 
everyone can give a score to anyone else through a five-star system implemented on their 
smartphones, displaying everyone’s name and current rating. As personal rating 
determines social status and access to jobs and housing, Lacie spends her day handling 
frenetically her smartphone trying to improve her rating, until she goes through a sudden 
and unexpected rating decrease. Such “nosedive” will drive her to madness while the 
spectator falls as well into an increasing anxiety towards a sinister and yet believable 
reality. The episode witnesses quite precisely how “digitalisation” is not just the breakout 
of new organisational and productive schemes. It interferes with the very essence of 
human life, reshaping the invisible borders between work time and free time, work place 
and home, and whoever gets work mails on his/her smartphone, at any time of the day 
and of the night, may confirm. 
Lightening the risks of reputational systems, Nosedive makes a fine and yet clear 
reference to Uber’s five-star rating system, one of the core points of the organisational 
schemes of the famous American Platform. Reputational systems constitute a leitmotiv of 
                                                          
* The paper is the revised and integrated version of the draft paper presented at the 15th International 
Conference in Commemoration of Professor Marco Biagi, Digital and Smart Work, Modena, Marco Biagi 
Foundation, 20-21 March 2017. A reduced version of the paper will be published in the conference 
proceedings. References made in the paper to Italian courts’ decisions and scientific reviews follow the 
editing criteria adopted by the Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro. 
1 H. SIMÕES GOMES, Justiça do Trabalho de MG decide que motorista tem vínculo empregatício com Uber, 
in globo.com, 14 February 2017; J. WEINBERG, Gig News: Brazilian Judge Finds Uber Driver is Employee, 
in Onlabor.org, 14 February 2017. 
2 REUTERS, Justiça do Trabalho de MG decide que motorista da Uber não é funcionário da empresa, in 
globo.com, 24 May 2017. 
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most of the platforms that provide services that can fall within the notion of “digital 
work”, as including “crowdwork” and “work on demand via apps”, the two main 
categories that have been identified in literature as part of a unitary phenomenon, calling 
for a unitary approach3.  
The similarities between the legal functioning of different platforms offering 
“digital work” services suggest indeed to adopt a same perspective in order to adequately 
take on the very same challenge4 brought by both types of “digital work”: the challenge 
to avoid technological (r)evolution from bringing also labour standards to a “nosedive”, 
allowing the rise of unregulated legal schemes apparently able to bypass statutory 
employment law by introducing elements of rupture with the traditional notions of 
employer and employee.  
In fact, platforms claim they operate under a legal scheme where, at a first glance, 
it looks like there is no room for the application of labour law. Such scheme, 
notwithstanding the several differences among the various work-on-demand platforms5, 
could be in most cases depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
In the perspective of avoiding this structure – which is, at least, theoretically 
conceivable – from entailing the breakout of a model where labour seems to fall into an 
“empty space of law”, the paper aims to verify whether it is possible and useful to search 
for some protective provisions applicable to digital workers outside the field of statutory 
employment law.  
The path of the reclassification, with the consequent application of statutory 
employment law, would be of course the most logical strategy in order to provide 
                                                          
3 V. DE STEFANO, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor 
Protection in the “Gig Economy”, in Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, n. 3, p. 474; 
E. DAGNINO, Il lavoro nella on-demand economy: esigenze di tutela e prospettive regolatorie, in Labour 
Law Issues, 2015, 2, p. 90, who observes that the main difference is that the former involves an “on-demand 
virtual workforce” while the latter involves an “on-demand mobile workforce”. In the perspective of a 
unitary approach also J. PRASSL & M. RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers? 
Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, in Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, vol. 37, n. 3, 
p. 619, who however use the term “crowdwork” for both the aforementioned types of work-on-demand. 
4 M. WEISS, Digitalizzazione: sfide e prospettive per il diritto del lavoro, in DRI, 2016, n. 3, p. 662. 
5 A. ALOISI, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-
Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, in Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, n. 3, p. 
688, where the A. indicates four key variables that may differ from platform to platform (means of 
exchange, system of payment, population of the users and workers’ status). 
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adequate protection to platform-mediated workers. This is the perspective of the first 
European decision on the status of Uber drivers6, issued by London’s Employment 
Tribunal on the 28th of October 2016 (exactly one week later after the release of 
Nosedive). Emphasising inter alia Uber’s reputational system7, Judge Snelson ruled that 
the relationships between the platform and the drivers are subject to statutory employment 
law provisions on minimum wage and paid leave.  
However, the challenge of “digitalisation”, in its tending towards a dangerous 
commodification of labour8, requires action on different frontlines, as the strategy of 
reclassification cannot be always adequate, correct or sufficient. Even Judge Snelson 
admitted that Uber “could have devised a business model not involving [it] employing 
drivers”9. Moreover, we are addressing a global phaenomenon, which has also to pass 
through the lenses of different legal systems, characterised by relevant differences with 
concern to the criteria employment judges would use to qualify the relationship.  
Thus, if one part of the strategy is definitely to return – where possible – to the 
domain of statutory employment law those relationships that are actually misclassified 
under applicable legislation, it seems necessary to conceive also a complementary path, 
especially in those jurisdictions where judicial reclassification would be difficult to reach.  
This happens to be the case of Italy, where first instance judges tend to give 
extreme importance to the circumstance that the worker is not technically bound to 
perform his/her tasks, supported by the Supreme Court enduring statement that “any 
human activity can be performed under the scheme of an employment relationship or 
under the scheme of self-employed work”10. In such jurisdiction, therefore, it seems 
necessary to make further reflections on the development – both at an interpretative and 
at a policy making level – of protective schemes applicable to all human beings that work, 
regardless of the legal scheme (employment, self-employment or other) under which they 
carry out their activities11. 
To this end, the first part of the paper (meant as a pars destruens) will deal with 
the problem of the qualification of the relationships involving the worker, the user and 
the platform, and will conclude that – at least under Italian law – many platforms may 
successfully claim the self-employed status of their workers. Even the existence of 
intermediation relationships seems convincing, although the platform does not carry only 
intermediary’s obligations.  
                                                          
6 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al. Among the first commentators: G. DAVIDOV, The Status of Uber 
Drivers: A Purposive Approach, forthcoming in Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations Journal; 
I. LLOYD, Uber Drivers in London: “To Be Or Not To Be” An Employee?, in Computer Law Review 
International, 2016, n. 6, p. 161. 
7 Ivi, p. 29, n. 8. 
8 B. BERGVALL‐KÅREBORN & D. HOWCROFT, Amazon Mechanical Turk and the Commodification of 
Labour, in New Technology, Work and Employment, 2014, vol. 29, n. 3, p. 213; ALOISI, Commoditized 
Workers, cit. p. 653. 
9 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 97. Also Advocate General Maciej Szpunar, delivering his 
Opinion in the Uber Case pending before the ECJ (infra, n. 75) noticed: “the company may very well provide 
its services through independent traders who act on its behalf as subcontractors” (§ 54). 
10 Among the most recent, Cass. 8 November 2016, n. 22658; 3 October 2016, n. 19701; 19 September 
2016, n. 18320, all in De Jure. 
11 P. TULLINI, C’è lavoro sul web?, in Labour Law Issues, 2015, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 9. 
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The second part of the paper (in the attempt to be a pars construens) will then 
analyse the consequences of such reconstruction under Italian law, with particular 
reference to some critical points (such as the possibility to “dismiss” an Uber driver 
because of his/her low reputational rates or to refuse Turkers’ work without payment). 
The paper will try to give an answer to those open questions through the application of 
general contract law, self-employed work rules and B2b regulations, with an eye to two 
recent Italian legislative proposals, in order to verify whether some protection can be 
found outside the domain of statutory employment law, and, in the affirmative, to what 
extent.  
2. Qualification Issues 
The qualification of the relationship as an employment or self-employment one 
represents a crucial standpoint in almost every jurisdiction12. Employees generally enjoy 
several statutory provisions (on wages, working time, and social security benefits) that 
independent contractors do not, on the ground of their supposed higher bargaining power 
and economic independence. 
It is quite difficult to qualify digital workers univocally either as employees or as 
independent contractors, as they find themselves in some sort of grey area13. The platform 
operates at the same time as a broker matching labour supply and demand, as a provider 
of services and goods and as an employer establishing the most important rules governing 
the transaction14, including its termination, which may consist in the deactivation of the 
worker’s account.  
As one of the first decisions from the U.S. litigation on platform drivers15 pointed 
out very clearly, “Lyft drivers don’t seem much like employees […] but Lyft drivers don’t 
seem much like independent contractors either”. “A reasonable jury could conclude that 
the plaintiff Lyft drivers were employees. But […] a reasonable jury could also conclude 
that they were independent contractors”16.  
In the U.S., the difficulties in reaching a clear consensus on the legal status of 
digital workers brought to significant litigation17, which appeared to undermine the 
entrepreneurial model adopted by the “work on demand via app” platforms18. 
Notwithstanding the worldwide debate it gave raise to, as many platforms accepted to 
                                                          
12 A. PERULLI, Economically dependent / quasi-subordinate (parasubordinate) employment: legal, social 
and economic aspects, European Commission 2003, p. 6. 
13 With reference to crowdwork, A. FELSTINER, Working the Crowd. Employment and Labor Law in the 
Crowdsourcing Industry, in Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labour Law, 2011, 32:1, p. 168, who 
pointed out as platforms deliberately decided to take advantage of the fact that “there were virtually no 
cases, and few indications in the legal literature as to how courts might approach regulation of the 
‘cyberspace workplace’”. 
14 TULLINI, C’è lavoro sul web?, cit., p. 8. 
15 Cotter et al. vs. Lyft Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04065-VC, Order denying cross-motions for summary 
judgement (California Northern District Court 11 March 2015). 
16 Ivi, p. 13. The judge consequently denied issuing a summary judgement, referring the case to a jury. 
17 M. CHERRY, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, in Comparative Labor Law 
& Policy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, n. 3, p. 577, providing an in-depth analysis of U.S. litigation. 
18 S. KESSLER, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued To Death, in fastcompany.com, 17 
February 2015; C. DEAMICIS, Homejoy Shuts Down after Battling Worker Classification Lawsuits, in 
recode.net, 17 July 2015.  
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negotiate a millionaire settlement19 (or even unilaterally decided to acknowledge the 
employee status of their workers20), the question is still open. 
The recent judgement issued by London’s Employment Tribunal took a clear 
position stating the applicability of the statutory rights related to minimum wage and paid 
leave to Uber drivers working in the London area, individuating a series of circumstances 
pointing to their “workers” status21. The anti-formalistic approach of the British judge in 
the case reflects the efforts of that literature that suggested to determine the scope of 
statutory employment law adopting a functional approach to the concept of Employer, 
instead of recurring to the “received” notions of employee22, even with particular 
reference to the case of platform work23. 
2.1. Are digital workers employees under Italian law? 
In Italy, gig-economy-related litigation raised first on competition law issues24, 
with licensed taxi drivers successfully preventing Uber from releasing the Uber-pop 
service, which would have allowed (unlicensed) private citizens to provide transportation 
services25. The Italian gig-economy faced its first defy from the labour side just in October 
2016, when Foodora drivers took collective action in reply to the decision of the Company 
to change their payment scheme from a gross 5,60 Euros per hour to a gross 3 Euros per 
delivery26. The mobilisation of Foodora drivers brought the problem of digital labour to 
the centre of the debate, gaining also the cover of the prestigious weekly magazine 
Internazionale27, and required the intervention of the Labour Department, after which the 
company increased the delivery fee to four gross Euros28. 
Even though in Italy the ascertainment of the employment status follows a path 
which is similar to the several tests developed in Common Law systems, as it focuses on 
                                                          
19 As in the aforementioned Cotter v. Lyft case, settled on 27 January 2016 for 12 million dollars, and in 
O’Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., settled on 21 April 2016 for almost 100 million dollars. 
CHERRY, Beyond misclassification, cit., notes that “the result is ultimately disappointing for those who saw 
this as a case that would most likely set a precedent”. 
20 It is the case of the shopping on-demand platform Instacart. D. ALBA, Instacart Shoppers Can Now 
Choose to be Real Employes, in wired.com, 22 June 2015, reports the CEO’s words, explaining that the 
company wanted “to provide supervision and training, which can only be done with employees”.  
21 The judgement reports (p. 29) thirteen circumstances, from “the fact that Uber interviews and recruits 
drivers” to “the fact that Uber subjects drivers through the rating system” and “reserves the power to amend 
the drivers’ terms unilaterally”. 
22 J. PRASSL, The Concept of the Employer, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 34, who focuses on 
the five main functions of the employer. 
23 PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co., cit., p. 636, where the functional method is applied to two 
platforms: Uber, who emerges as a “sole employer” and Taskrabbit, where the main functions are shared 
between the platform and the users. 
24 N. RAMPAZZO, Rifkin e Uber. Dall'età dell'accesso all'economia dell'eccesso, in Diritto dell'informazione 
e dell'Informatica, 2015, II, 6, p. 957. 
25 Trib. Milano 25 May 2015 and Trib. Milano 2 July 2015, both in Diritto dell’informazione e 
dell’informatica, 2015, 6, at p. 1053 and 1068 respectively. 
26 G. MOSCA, Lo sciopero contro Foodora è il sogno infranto della sharing economy, in Wired.it, 11 
October 2016. 
27 N. 1174, 7/13 October 2016, p. 44, translating S. O’CONNOR, When your Boss is an Algorithm, in ft.com, 
8 September 2016. 
28 F. SAVELLI, «Quattro euro a consegna, contributi e assicurazione infortuni: vi spieghiamo perché 
paghiamo così», in Corriere.it, 4 November 2016. 
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the degree of control that the employer exercises on the execution of the performance29, 
to seek the re-classification of many digital workers as employees under Italian law could 
be somewhat “gasping”30.  
While common law jurisdictions developed a series of different “tests” to 
determine the application of the different statutory regulations applicable to the 
employment relationship, Italian law, as many other continental laws, provides for a 
unitary notion of employee, i.e. “who engaged himself to cooperate for remuneration in 
an enterprise by working manually or intellectually under the direction of the 
entrepreneur”31. The identification of the characters of the employee’s subordination – 
as opposite to the self-employed worker’s autonomy – has always been an evergreen 
topic, accompanying the development of Italian labour law from its very beginning to the 
challenges brought by technological innovation32.  
The reasoning adopted by case law and administrative authorities on the 
qualification of the status of pony expresses and of call center workers represented an 
important step in the elaboration of the criteria used to identify employment relationships. 
Today, the reasoning developed in those cases looks like the most persuasive argument 
for whoever would have to defend before a court the self-employment status of digital 
workers. 
2.1.1. From ponies to kangaroos. “Work on demand via app” in the light of 
the Italian case law on pony expresses 
If you just change his walky-talky with a smartphone, a pony express from the 
roaring 80s presents many similarities with those forms of “work on demand via apps” 
that provide delivering services (such as Deliveroo, Foodora and JustEat, whose drivers 
you can easily spot in many Italian streets)33. 
A significant litigation accompanied the development of the pony express 
business model, together with an animated doctrinal debate34. Several first instance 
judges acknowledged the existence of employment relationships, in labour proceedings 
promoted by the worker35 or by the Social Security Authority (INPS) 36 as well as in 
                                                          
29 As provided also by ILO Recommendation concerning the employment relationship n. 198/2006, part. II, 
clause 13, which gives relevance to “the fact that the work is carried out according to the instructions and 
under the control of another party”. 
30 TULLINI, C’è lavoro sul web?, cit., p. 11. 
31 As translated by T. TREU, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Italy, 2nd edition, Kluwer Law 
International, 2007, p. 35. 
32 O. RAZZOLINI, La nozione di subordinazione alla prova delle nuove tecnologie, in DRI, 2014, n. 4, p. 
974. 
33 D. DI VICO, Foodora, Deliveroo e Just Eat: la vita da pony express hi-tech, corriere.it 15 October 2016. 
34 L. DE ANGELIS, I pony express tra subordinazione e autonomia, in G.G. DEODATO, E. SINISCALCHI, 
Autonomia e subordinazione nelle nuove figure professionali del terziario, Milano 1988, p. 57; A.M. 
CHIESI, Il tempo del lavoro nel settore della consegna immediata, in IRES/Papers, Collana ricerche n. 10, 
Milano 1986.  
35 Pret. Milano 20 June 1986, in RIDL, 1987, II, p. 70, critically commented by ICHINO, and in OGL, 1986, 
II, p. 983, critically commented by SPAGNUOLO VIGORITA. 
36 Pret. Milano 7 October 1988, in FI, 1989, II, c. 2908; Pret. Torino 12 February 1996, in RIDL, 1997, II, 
p. 290, commented by ZANOTELLI. 
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criminal trials37. Such decisions represented the attempt to interpret the legal notion of 
employee as an open reference “to the economic and social reality in its variety and 
historical dynamicity”38. Emphasising the economic dependency of the worker, his/her 
insertion into an entrepreneurial organisation, the degree of control exercised by the 
company and the continuity of the performance, those decisions deemed irrelevant the 
allegation that workers were free to accept or refuse the single tasks assigned, rejecting 
the companies’ main defence. The reasoning made more than thirty years ago that “it is 
not realistic to sustain that messengers are free to accept or decline the single task. […] 
once he chooses to work to gain money, the messenger is actually bound to answer the 
call to perform the delivery”39, resembles some of the considerations made by Common 
Law judges in the Uber proceedings40. 
Higher courts, however, did not embrace this interpretative option and overruled 
the first instance decisions, individuating precisely in the freedom to refuse tasks the main 
element excluding the existence of a tie of subordination41. The fact that in many cases 
the pony express carried out the activity continuously was deemed irrelevant, supported 
by those Authors pointing out that the employment status finds its reason in a legal-only 
notion of continuity, i.e. in the “legitimate expectation of the creditor on the continuity of 
the performance according to a program agreed in advance”42. 
Since higher courts continue to uphold this orientation43, it seems very difficult 
for the many digital workers occupied in the sector of transportation and delivering 
services to achieve the judicial ascertainment of the employee status under Italian law. 
2.1.2. When your cubicle is at home. “Crowdwork” in the light of the Italian 
decisions on call center workers 
Call centers were at the centre of literature’s reflections in the first decade of this 
century44. As they gave rise to the most massive concentration of allegedly self-employed 
workers in a particular economic sector45, call centers became emblematic of the 
                                                          
37 Pret. Pen. Milano 27 April 1987, in L80, 1987, P. 258, commented by CHIUSOLO. 
38 Pret. Milano 20 June 1986, cit., p. 71. 
39 Ivi, p. 73 f. Therefore the judgement concludes that  “to sustain that they are self-employed workers … 
would mean to misrepresent the legal relevance of their work through a formal-only use of the traditional 
criteria, but also a socially and historically wrong evaluation” (p. 75). 
40 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., considered irrelevant the fact that Uber drivers “are never under 
any obligation to switch on the App or, even if logged on, to accept any driving assignment” (n. 85). Also 
according to O’Connor et. al. v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., Order denying defendant’s motion for 
summary judgement (California Northern District 11 March 2015), p. 7, “the fact that a certain amount of 
freedom is allowed or is inherent in the nature of the work involved does not preclude a finding of 
employment status”. 
41 At first by second instance judges (Trib. Milano 10 October 1987, in FI, 1989, I, c. 2632), and then by 
the Supreme Court (Cass. 10 July 1991, n. 7608, in RIDL, 1992, II, p. 370, commented by VIGANÒ, and in 
RGL 1992, II, p. 505, commented by CHIACCHIERONI. 
42 P. ICHINO, Libertà formale e libertà materiale del lavoratore nella qualificazione della prestazione come 
autonoma o subordinata, in RIDL, 1987, II, p. 80. 
43 Cass. 20 January 2011, n. 1238, in GCM, 2011, n. 1, p. 85. 
44  M. MARAZZA, Il mercato del lavoro dopo il caso Atesia. Percorsi alternativi di rientro dalla precarietà, 
in ADL, 2007, 2, p. 327; V. DI BELLA, Call center e co.co.pro, in DPL, 2007, p. 1459; A. MARESCA & L. 
CAROLLO, Il contratto di collaborazione a progetto nel settore call center, in DRI, 2007, 3, p. 675. 
45 MARAZZA, Il mercato del lavoro, cit., p. 329. 
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condition of precariousness of many Italian workers, deserving also a role in popular 
culture and cinema46. 
Some of the outcomes reached by legal literature, case law and public authorities 
should be taken into consideration when it comes to the qualification of crowdworkers, 
i.e. those digital workers who do not only meet their tasks but also perform them online, 
constituting a global virtual workforce47. 
In fact, there is not that much difference between the human intelligence tasks 
crowdsourced through Amazon Mechanical Turk and other crowdsourcing platforms and 
some of the tasks performed in call centers. In both cases, we are mostly before labour 
intensive activities involving the execution of monotone and repetitive “microtasks” that 
do not require particular skills. 
Also due to the political relevance of the problem of repressing misguided 
employment relationships, during the centre-left Prodi Government (2006-2008) and the 
centre-right Berlusconi government (2008-2011) the Italian Ministry of Labour 
repeatedly issued interpretative criteria to determine the conditions under which it is 
possible to work in a call center under a self-employment relationship. 
A 2006 circular addressed to labour inspectors48 clarified that only call center 
workers who perform in bound activities – i.e. who undertake to answer to incoming calls 
– shall be always deemed as employees. With reference to out bound workers – i.e. those 
who undertake a campaigning project consisting in making a certain amount of calls – the 
circular stated that it is possible to qualify the relationship as a self-employed one insofar 
as the worker is free “a) to decide whether to perform the activity and when; b) to schedule 
the daily working time; c) to suspend the execution of the performance”49. In this case, 
safe for forms of coordination with the client, the out bound worker can determine 
autonomously his working schedule and therefore falls beyond the scope of the employee 
notion. Although the Ministry is not a Legislator and was just addressing labour 
inspectors, the document had a significant impact also on case law, with some decisions 
deeming as self-employed out bound workers50 and other decisions emphasising the non-
binding nature of the ministerial document51. 
Aware of the difficulties in applying the criterion based on the distinction between 
in bound and out bound activities, the Ministry issued in 2008 a second circular52 which 
narrowed the scope of self-employed work in call centers, individuating a series of factors 
which would entail reclassification of out bound self-employed workers53. The successive 
                                                          
46 Some movies marked that turn point, such as Tutta la vita davanti (2008) and Generazione 1000 Euro 
(2009). 
47 DAGNINO, Il lavoro nella on-demand economy, cit., p. 90. 
48 Ministry of Labour Circular 14 June 2006, n. 17. 
49 Ivi, p. 4. Critical M. ROCCELLA, Manuale di diritto del lavoro, Giappichelli, Torino 2010, p. 60, who 
considered artificial and unable to contrast misclassification the distinction between in bound and out bound 
workers. 
50 Trib. Roma 3 December 2008, in DPL, 2009, p. 1887. 
51 Trib. Milano 18 January 2007, in DPL, 2007, p. 1264. 
52 Ministry of Labour Circular 31 March 2008, n. 8. 
53 Such as: a) the lack of the determination of the specific promotional campaign assigned to the worker; b) 
the assignment of also in bound activities, even though partially; c) the determination by the call center of 
the working time; d) the impossibility, due to the informatics devices used by the worker, to freely schedule 
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centre-right government, however, clarified that such sort of presumption of the existence 
of an employment relationship contrasted with the discipline of self-employed project-
related work provided for by legislative decree 276/2003, as well as with the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence54.  
Even adopting the broadest approach promoted by the first document, however, 
the subjection to the direction of the employer also with regard to the definition of the 
working period still represents an element that is necessary to claim the employment 
status successfully. 
In light of these principles, it would be even more difficult in most cases to classify 
as employees, under Italian law, those workers who perform their activity on 
crowdsourcing platforms. Not only they are free – like the out bound call center workers 
– to determine their working schedule in terms of time, but they also retain “the freedom 
to choose when and where to work, how long to spend, and what work to perform”55. In 
addition, the fact that they perform their activity from their own homes, or from any place 
where a Wi-Fi connection is available – thus without any physical relationship with any 
workplace – would constitute a further element that an Italian judge may valorise in order 
to deny reclassification. 
2.2. The unsatisfactory recourse to intermediate categories 
Pony expresses and call center workers case law shows that – despite the attempts 
to valorise the economic and social weakness of the worker – Italian labour law developed 
a legal-only notion of subordination, meant as the provision of a personal effort, in terms 
of time and energies, to the employer and subject to his direction56. Even though judges 
would evaluate the circumstance of the effective and stable introduction of the worker in 
the firm’s organisation and a series of secondary criteria, the autonomy of the worker with 
respect to time scheduling, choice of tasks and working place appears to be de iure 
condito an unsurmountable obstacle to reclassification in terms of an employment 
relationship. 
It is also hard to assimilate properly digital workers to the category of “quasi-
subordinate workers” or “dependent contractors” developed in Italy, German and Spain, 
as some scholars suggested57. In general, the notion of “economic dependency” postulates 
that the worker devotes the main part of his activity to a single client58, while in the case 
of digital work, as it has been noted, there is often no stable counterparty to burden with 
duties and responsibilities59. 
                                                          
working time; e) the impossibility for the worker to interrupt the performance through a “break” command; 
f) the exercise of directive and disciplinary power by the call center company. 
54 Ministerial Note 3 December 2008, n. 17286. 
55 FELSTINER, Working the crowd, cit., p. 154. 
56 The father of Italian labour law, Ludovico Barassi, sustained such legal-only notion of subordination in 
the first decades of the XX century (L. BARASSI, Il contratto di lavoro nel diritto positivo italiano, Società 
Editrice Libraria, Milano 1915, p. 6 f.). 
57 S.D. HARRIS & A.B. KRUEGER, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: 
The "Independent Worker", The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2015-10, December 2015.  
58 A. PERULLI, Un Jobs Act per il lavoro autonomo: verso una nuova disciplina della dipendenza 
economica?, in CSDLE, It, 235/2015, p. 16. 
59 M. FORLIVESI, La sfida della rappresentanza sindacale dei lavoratori 2.0, in DRI, 2016, n. 3, p. 666. 
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The scope of the Italian definition of quasi-subordinate workers includes those 
workers who, without any tie of subordination, provide continuously a mostly personal 
activity under the coordination of the counterpart of the contract (art. 409 civil procedure 
code, as emended in 1973 for the purpose of the extension of a few employment 
warranties to quasi-subordinate workers). Even though coordinated and continuous 
collaborations were treated as self-employed relationships, some particular rules were set 
with regard to social security contributions, which are carried for 2/3 by the client (art. 2 
(30) Law 335/1995). The so-called Biagi Reform (Legislative Decree 276/2003) provided 
for a series of measures in the attempt to preserve the autonomous character of such 
collaboration agreements, which had to be related to a specific “project”, under penalty 
of reclassification. 
The recent reform of Italian labour law known as Jobs Act, however, abrogated 
the whole discipline on project-related work (art. 61-69.bis, Legislative Decree 276/2003) 
that was applicable to quasi-subordinate workers. Such abrogation, together with the 
parallel re-conduction to the field of employment of so-called hetero-organised 
relationships60, has been waved by the government as the elimination of a precarious and 
unpopular non-standard contract61 .  
However, it is to say that, on one hand, the last measure may not in fact contain 
any real innovation, as courts already used the criterion of temporal and spatial hetero-
organisation62. On the other hand, what has been eliminated is not the possibility to recur 
to quasi-subordinate work but just the few warranties that had been introduced to avoid 
its abusive recourse (such as the duty to indicate the specific “project” for which the 
contract is stipulated). 
If we consider the counterpart of the self-employed digital worker to be the several 
clients that he may happen to serve, it would be quite difficult to conclude that such 
activity, which is certainly personal, is characterised by the elements of continuity and 
coordination. The terms and conditions of some platforms appear to foresee the risks for 
a single client to repeatedly receive services from a same worker63, and decline any 
responsibility for the case that such continuous recourse entails the constitution of an 
employment relationship under applicable legislation64. 
If we evaluate the existence of the elements of continuity and coordination with 
reference to the relationship between the worker and the platform, instead, we could easily 
conclude that in many cases there is a quasi-subordinate relationship falling within the 
scope of art. 409, n. 3, of the Civil Procedure Code. Yet such classification would not 
                                                          
60 I.e. those relationships involving the execution of a performance that is organised by the counterpart also 
with respect to the time and the place of the execution (art. 2, Legislative Decree 81/2015). 
61 In an interview Prime Minister Renzi proudly claimed the intention to eliminate coordinated and 
continuous collaborations, project-related work “and all that kind of stuff” (La Repubblica, 30 November 
2014). 
62 O. MAZZOTTA, Lo strano caso delle collaborazioni organizzate dal committente, in Labor, 2016, 1/2, p. 
7; P. TOSI, L’art. 2, comma 1, d.gs. 81/2015: Una norma apparente?, in ADL, 2015, 6, p. 1117. 
63 AMT Participation Agreement, § 3: “You acknowledge that, while Providers are agreeing to perform 
Services for you as independent contractors and not employees, repeated and frequent performance of 
Services by the same Provider on your behalf could result in reclassification of that employment status”. 
64 Taskrabbit Terms of Service, § 12. 
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provide the worker (rectius, the collaborator) with any significant degree of substantial 
protection. 
In Italy, some platforms have qualified their relationship with workers as a 
coordinated and continuous collaborations (it is the case of the Foodora delivery 
platform), and yet the platform is still able to pay fees which are far under minimum wage, 
letting workers earn something like three euros per hour. Therefore, even when it is 
possible to deem as quasi-subordinate the workers who continuously work on the same 
platforms, the qualification in terms of quasi-subordinate workers is not per se sufficient 
to guarantee further protection to those digital workers who would not be able to reach 
reclassification as employees. The classification as quasi-subordinate workers, 
conclusively, should not indeed be considered a sort of panacea65, and would probably 
end up creating even more uncertainty66. 
2.3. Self-employed workers in many cases, unfortunately 
The considerations set forth on the qualification of digital workers’ legal status 
under Italian law suggest that even though the language used in the terms and conditions 
set by platforms may be seen as “twisted language … [that] merits, we think, a degree of 
scepticism”67, the claim that platforms are not parties of any employment relationships is 
not that easy to undermine. Even outside Italian law and its narrow notion of employee, 
the qualification in terms of self-employment laid down in the platforms’ terms and 
conditions appears convincing de iure condito68, although the often-unsustainable 
consequences of such qualification (with reference to working conditions and 
occupational stability) may suggest the opportunity to consider the platforms as 
employers or at least joint employers69.  
The conclusion that the examined digital workers are in most cases self-employed 
contractors does not derive from an overvaluation of the contractual label (nomen iuris), 
which is substantially irrelevant. Such a qualification, instead, is strongly suggested by 
the circumstance that – safe for pathological cases – they are not actually bound to the 
directive power of any employer as long as they truly retain the freedom to choose when 
and where to work. 
Such conclusion is coherent also with European law, which does not impose any 
wider qualification criterion (and probably could not do so, as there is no EU competence 
                                                          
65 DE STEFANO, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”, cit., p. 497; M. CHERRY & A. ALOISI, 
“Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy. A Comparative Approach, in American University Law 
Review, 2017, vol. 66, p. 635. 
66 E. MENEGATTI, A fair wage for workers-on-demand via app, draft paper presented at the 15th International 
Conference in Commemoration of Professor Marco Biagi, Digital and Smart Work, Modena, Marco Biagi 
Foundation, 20-21 March 2017, courtesy of the Author, p. 10. 
67 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 87. 
68 BERGVALL-KÅREBORN & HOWCROFT, Amazon Mechanical Turk, cit., p. 218; DE STEFANO, The Rise of 
the “Just-in-Time Workforce”, cit., p. 478; DAGNINO, Il lavoro nella on-demand economy, cit., p. 91; W. 
DÄUBLER, Challenges to labour law, in A. PERULLI  (ed.), L’idea del diritto del lavoro. Oggi. In ricordo di 
Giorgio Ghezzi, Cedam-Wolters Kluwer, 2016, p. 501 ff.  
69 It is the interpretative proposal made by PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co., cit. On the concept 
of joint employment, at the centre of the debate both in Civil Law and in Common Law jurisdictions, O. 
RAZZOLINI & L. CORAZZA, Who is an employer?, in WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D'Antona”.INT – 110/2014. 
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on the qualification of employment relationships). In fact, the European Court of Justice 
individuated the essence of subordination in the circumstance that the worker “acts under 
the direction of his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, 
the place and the object of his work”70. 
The “freedom” of the worker and the presence of a plurality of users suggest that 
the legal framework of digital work could actually be the triangular scheme – proposed 
by platforms themselves – of “self-employed work intermediation”, involving three 
contracts: one self-employment contract between the worker and the user, and two frame 
intermediation contracts stipulated by the platform with both the worker and the user. 
At the beginning of the paper it has been noted how such scheme may deprive 
“digital” (self-employed) workers of any protection. The following paragraphs will try to 
analyse more in depth the relationships involved in the triangular scheme proposed by the 
platforms themselves, in order to verify whether – when reclassification would not be 
accorded by a judge – the rules governing the specific relationships, as well as those 
applicable by virtue of the contractual integration between them, may prevent digital 
workers to fall within an “empty space of law”. 
2.4. Mere intermediary or party to the self-employment contract? 
If there is a self-employment relationship, we should first ask ourselves who the 
counterpart of the worker in such relationship is. If we accept the reconstruction operated 
by the platform, we should say that it is only the time-per-time user, and that therefore 
not even he/she who works eight hours per day via the same platform can be considered 
someone “continuously serving a same main client”. 
While we have seen that the qualification in terms of self-employment laid down 
by the platforms may appear convincing (safe for pathological cases), the claim that they 
just intermediate the provision of transportation services by the users seems more 
artificial, almost absurd71. About Ubers’ activity, labour judges have noted that “Uber 
does not simply sell software; it sells rides. Uber is no more a “technological company” 
than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’ because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi 
cabs”72 and that it is “unreal to deny that Uber is in business as a supplier of 
transportation services. Simple common sense argues to the contrary”73. Also 
competition law judges held the platform responsible for carrying a transportation 
service74, and a Barcelona judge requested for an ECJ’s preliminary ruling on the question 
of the nature of the activity carried out by Uber75. 
                                                          
70 ECJ 2 December 2014, C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, in 
European Competition Law Review, 2015, p. 181, commented by BABIRAD, and in RIDL, 2015, II, p. 566, 
commented by ICHINO. 
71 WEISS, Digitalizzazione, cit., p. 656. 
72 O’Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., p. 10. 
73 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 89. 
74 Trib. Milano 2 July 2015, cit., p. 1076, where the judge underlines as “it seems in fact possible to 
assimilate completely the intermediation activity to the taxi services [as] the conduct of the Company 
results certainly inextricably connected to the activity performed by the single drivers who violate the 
discipline governing the provision of taxi services”.  
75 Request for a preliminary ruling 7 August 2015, C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber 
Systems Spain, S.L. The decision of the Luxembourg Court, may have relevant consequences also for labour 
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The same functional approach proposed to individuate in the platforms the 
employer or one of the employers of the digital worker76 could be useful also in the 
different perspective of the individuation of the counterpart of the self-employement 
relationship. 
The platform acts indeed as a “cumbersome middleman”77 and the intermediation 
contracts are both deeply connected with the self-employment contract. In fact, the 
intermediation contract sets the frame within which several self-employment contracts 
are stipulated by the worker and a plurality of clients. Platforms do not only intermediate 
service; they provide services to users by connecting them to the workers who would 
actually perform the required activity following the indications set by the platforms 
themselves. 
A good example of the effects of the contractual integration between the self-
employment relationship and the frame intermediation contract comes from Chinese case 
law regarding the platform operator Didi Chuxing, which acquired Uber’s Chinese 
operations in August 201678. Although Chinese courts were reluctant to accord a 
reclassification of the “cooperation agreements” signed by the workers, they have in fact 
imposed some degree of responsibility on the platforms in cases concerning liability for 
traffic accidents, brought forward by third parties seeking compensation for traffic 
incidents caused by drivers79. 
Therefore, as platforms do intermediate, they will respond for the obligations 
deriving from the intermediation contracts they subscribe with the users and the workers. 
The mediation contract is also a contractual type regulated by dispositive provisions of 
the Italian civil code (art. 1754 and ff.). The user-platform relationship shall meet the 
requirements set forth by consumer law when the user is a physical person, acting for 
non-entrepreneurial purposes, and even with regard to the worker-platform 
intermediation contract it would not be out of place to think about the application of 
consumers protection against vexatious clauses, emphasising the circumstance that the 
worker acts as a “prosumer”80. 
However, in the perspective of the aforementioned contractual integration, as 
platforms set also the rules governing the self-employment relationship, they do also 
become a party to that relationship or, at the very least, they should still be held 
responsible for those breaches of the self-employment contract to which they participated, 
even when the input comes from the user. 
                                                          
lawyers, as it could state that Uber effectively runs a transportation business. Advocate General Maciej 
Szpunar delivered his Opinion on the 11th of May 2017, pointing out that as a transportation services 
provider Uber shall be subject to limitations set forth by national and local legislation with concern to 
special authorisation regimes, limitations that are allowed by art. 2 (2) (d), Directive 2006/123/CE, on 
services in the internal market. 
76 PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co., cit., p. 635 f. 
77 A. DONINI, Il lavoro digitale su piattaforma, in Labour Law Issues, 2015, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 59; S.C. MOATTI, 
The Sharing Economy’s New Middlemen, in hbr.org, 5 March 2015. 
78 M. ZOU, ‘Uberization’ and the Digital Workforce in China: Regulating the Status of Ride-Hailing 
Drivers, draft paper presented at the 15th International Conference in Commemoration of Professor Marco 
Biagi, Digital and Smart Work, Modena, Marco Biagi Foundation, 20-21 March 2017. 
79 Ivi, p. 15 ff. 
80 ALOISI, Commoditized workers, cit., p. 664 f. 
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We may therefore find in the worker-platform relationship the character of 
continuity that is missing with regard to the relationship between the worker and the user 
(entailing the application of quasi-subordinate discipline). In addition, even the most 
occasional worker may enforce against the platform the rights deriving from the self-
employment relationship.  
But what rights are we talking about? 
3. Self-employed work rights and their sources 
In Italy, as in most civil law countries, the discipline of self-employed work 
contracts is quite gaunt (only seven articles in the Civil Code, art. 2222 to 2228) and it 
construes the notion of the self-employed worker in negative, by stressing the lack of 
subordination. Labour lawyers, with some exceptions81, have not often focused on such 
discipline, as they have limited the analysis to the problem of qualification82. 
The challenge of “digital work”, however, could be an opportunity to develop a 
new perspective on the protection of self-employed personal work. It does not seem a 
coincidence that the recent Italian Bill 2233 (infra, § 3.2) contains in the same text 
provisions on “autonomous non-entrepreneurial work” (first part) and employment 
provisions “promoting flexibility with reference to the working time and place” (second 
part). The structure of the bill itself thus confirms that the digitalisation of labour – of 
standards types and of new forms of labour – requires action on different frontlines. 
Moreover, European contract law has indeed developed in the last decades a 
human dimension in regulating contracts characterised by the imbalance of the parties83, 
on the ground of the interpretative evaluation of the general clause of good faith84 as well 
as because of the legislative intervention in the field of consumer law and B2b contracts85. 
In this perspective, it has been underlined that contract law represents nowadays – perhaps 
even more than labour law itself – “a fruitful field for the ethical evaluation of 
entrepreneurial behaviours”86. 
With respect to that apparent “empty space of law” where self-employed digital 
workers seem to fall, it is important to stress out that some rules would still apply. 
Contract law general principles (such as the principle of good faith and correctness), 
                                                          
81 A. PERULLI, Il lavoro autonomo. Contratto d’opera e professioni intellettuali, Giuffrè, Milano 1996. 
82 As pointed out by M.T. CARINCI, Il contratto d’opera, in G. GITTI, M. MAUGERI, M. NOTARI (Eds.), I 
contratti per l’impresa, Il Mulino, Bologna 2012, p. 176. 
83 L. NOGLER & U. REIFNER, Life Time Contracts: Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy and 
Consumer Credit Law, Eleven International Publishing 2014. 
84 F. DENOZZA, Il lavoro nell’impresa neo-liberale, in M.T. CARINCI (Ed.), Dall'impresa a rete alle reti 
d'impresa. Scelte organizzative e diritto del lavoro, Giuffrè, Milano 2015, p. 75, insisting on the utility of 
general clauses as applicable to every field of private law. 
85 I.e. those contractual relationships between a strong main firm and a series of small or micro-businesses 
who depending on the former. G. GITTI & G. VILLA, Il terzo contratto. L’abuso di potere contrattuale nei 
rapporti tra imprese, Il Mulino, Bologna 2008; E. LABELLA, Tutela della microimpresa e “terzo contratto”, 
in EDP, 2015, n. 4, p. 857. 
86 A. PERULLI, Il controllo giudiziale dei poteri dell’imprenditore tra evoluzione legislativa e diritto vivente, 
in RIDL, 2015, I, n. 1, p. 83. 
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would find full application, prohibiting those behaviours that result in the abusive 
exercise of the rights descending from the contract87.  
On another level, it would be appropriate to consider the application of the 
discipline of B2b contracts, and in particular of art. 9, Law 192/1998, which prohibits the 
“abuse of economic dependency” 88 of a small firm towards a main client. Although such 
provision is contained in a Law regulating the “sub-supply” commercial relationships, the 
Italian Supreme Court clarified that article 9 has a wider scope than the other provisions 
of that Law, as it constitutes a “general clause”, applicable to any contractual relationship 
in which an abuse of economic dependence may occur89. On this ground, it seems 
reasonable to extend the application of the prohibition of the abuse of economic 
dependency to self-employment relationships, in order to protect, at the very least, 
autonomous workers from suffering unilaterally and arbitrary decisions made by their 
counterpart90. 
The combination of the few Civil Code provisions regarding self-employment, 
together with the general principles of contract law and the extensive interpretation of the 
B2b contracts rules, may result in a discipline capable to provide some protection against 
some of the critical issues raised by platform-mediated work, as the following paragraphs 
will try to argue. 
3.1. Some consequences under private law 
Most platforms retain the power to exclude the worker from the use of the 
platform, by deactivating his/her account. If we consider digital workers as employees 
such deactivation may be deemed as a dismissal, and would therefore need to comply 
with national and European provisions requiring the dismissal to be justified91. Self-
employed workers, instead, do not enjoy the same warranties. The relevance of the 
problem of “deactivation power” emerges if only we take into account the circumstance 
that one of the conditions contained in the Cotter v. Lyft settlement proposal provided for 
the enforcement of a grievance process heard by an arbitrator to be undertaken before 
account deactivation92.  
Deactivation, actually, does look more like the termination of the intermediation 
contract than like the termination of the self-employment relationship that is framed 
within it. In this perspective, the specific provision about the termination of the self-
                                                          
87 U. MORELLO, Abuso del diritto: la difficile via della concretizzazione, in A. GAMBARO & U. MORELLO 
(Eds.), Lezioni di diritto civile, Giuffrè, Milano 2013, p. 685, the reference is in particular to the principles 
stated in the famous Renault Case, where the Italian Supreme Court (Cass. 18 September 2009, n. 20106, 
in I contratti 2010, p. 5) deemed abusive the sudden and unjustified termination of a franchise relationship 
between Renault and a small agent condemning the French Company to reparation for damage and loss. 
88 Economic dependency is defined as “the situation allowing a firm to determine, in its commercial 
relationship with another firm, an excessive imbalance of rights and duties”. 
89 Cass. S.U. 25 November 2011, n. 24906, in Foro italiano 2012, 3, I, 805. 
90 D. DEL BIONDO, L’abuso di dipendenza economica nei confronti dei lavoratori autonomi, in M.T. 
CARINCI (Ed.), Dall'impresa a rete alle reti d'impresa, cit., p. 423. 
91 As art. 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union clearly states, “every worker has 
the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Community law and national laws 
and practices”.  
92 CHERRY, Beyond Misclassification, cit., p. 583. The provision of a due process before deactivation 
resembles closely the protective schemes adopted against dismissal. 
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employment contract provided for by art. 2227 of the Civil Code, providing for the right 
to terminate at will the relationship by paying the worker a compensation, does not seem 
any useful. If we consider deactivation as the termination of the intermediation frame, on 
the contrary, we could usefully recur to contract law general principles and B2b contracts 
regulations to syndicate its legitimacy. 
Two decisions from Southern Italy regarding the famous online auction and 
shopping website Ebay may represent a good example. Both decisions, rendered in the 
contest of the special “urgency” proceeding provided for by art. 700 of the Civil 
Procedure Code, ordered the Company to re-activate the accounts of two sellers who had 
been de-activated due to negative feedbacks.  
The first decision93 deemed unlawful the deactivation under the general rules on 
contract termination set forth by the Civil Code (art. 1454 and ff.), considering the mere 
presence of low feedback ratings as not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a serious 
breach of the contract. The judge considered that a clause allowing resolution only due to 
negative feedbacks would be a vexatious clause requiring double subscription (missing 
in the case) for its enforceability94. However, it has been noted that even in the presence 
of a second subscription, the clause would still be void under art. 9 L. 192/1998, as it 
realises “an abusive imposition of unjustifiably vexatious conditions”95. 
The second decision96 seems more aware of the social and economic dimension 
of the problem and gave relevance to the oligopolistic structure of Ebay’s on-line 
marketplace. The judge recognised the existence of the so-called periculum in mora 
(necessary to access to the urgency proceeding) because “the exclusion from Ebay does 
not only produce some lost clients, but excludes a micro-business from the market 
itself”97. However, the judgement explicitly excluded the application of consumer 
protection law and of Law 1992/1998, on the ground that there was no “introduction of 
the micro-business in the productive process of a main client”98. 
What is interesting about the two aforementioned decisions is that, even moving 
within the field of general contract law, they are still able to grant the weak party of the 
relationship a real protection, a sort of reinstatement, reaching an effect that recalls the 
traditional sanction against unjustified dismissal. It is a revolutionary conclusion, as it 
goes even further the – yet quite revolutionary – conclusions reached in the Renault Case, 
where the ascertainment of an abusive termination of the contract entailed only 
compensatory remedies99. 
                                                          
93 Trib. Messina 7 July 2010, in Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2011, p. 118, commented by 
CIMINO. 
94 Art. 1341 (2) of the civil code provides a list of clauses that require double subscription if they are 
contained in general terms and conditions set by one party without negotiation, as the clause allowing that 
party to freely terminate the contract.  
95 I.P. CIMINO, Sospensione dell'account di vendita nel marketplace di ebay, tutela del contratto e della 
libertà di impresa nel commercio elettronico, in Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2011, p. 132 
f., who notes that “unjustifiably vexatious conditions” in B2b relationships are mainly those allowing the 
strong party to unilaterally modify the rules governing the contract and to terminate it without notice. 
96 Trib. Catanzaro 30 April 2012, in Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2012, p. 1174, commented 
by ARANGUENA. 
97 Ivi, p. 1180. 
98 Ivi, p. 1176.  
99 Supra, n. 87. 
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Many of the considerations resulting from by the aforementioned decisions deal 
with the reputational systems adopted by some platforms. With regard to digital workers, 
it would be easier to invoke the invalidity under art. 9 Law 192/1998 of vexatious clauses 
granting termination at will powers to the counterpart, as there is nothing ancillary to the 
platforms business in their activity100. In this perspective, it is possible to give a partial 
answer to the question is account deactivation a new form of dismissal?101 Without the 
reclassification of the relationship, there is no room for the application of statutory 
protection against dismissal. However, it is still possible to prevent the unjustified 
exclusions of workers from the platforms. Low ratings can bring to deactivation only 
when they derive from a seriously neglect conduct of the worker and a minimal procedure 
to allow the worker to defend himself/herself shall be accorded in any case under the 
general clause of good faith. 
The issue is strictly connected with the problem of the control that the platform is 
capable to exercise on the execution of the performance, even by delegating it to users by 
means of reputational systems102. Such control, in fact, may be compatible with the self-
employed nature of the relationship, but only as long as it remains a control on the result 
of the work – in order to guarantee minimum standards of quality and safety – and not on 
the execution of the worker’s performance. Nonetheless, the border between these two 
objects of the platforms’ control can indeed be quite evanescent in many cases103.  
Certainly, however, personal ratings should not depend on the amount of time the 
worker devotes to the tasks delivered via app, coherently with the alleged self-
employment status. Should the reputational system “punish” dormant workers, they 
would be able to react invoking an employee status, as they would end up to be at the 
disposal of an employer (as Judge Snelson noticed, quoting Milton, “they also serve who 
only stand and wait”104). Nevertheless, at the same time, they would also have the 
possibility to invoke their self-employment status in order to prevent the platform from 
affecting their rate or to “dismiss” them without a concrete reasonable cause. Although it 
is clear that the acknowledgement of an employment status would bring much more 
benefits, it may also be useful to provide the worker with a “second bullet”, in a context 
characterised by uncertainty and by the malleability of employment tests105. 
Although the case of the termination of the contract through account deactivation 
seems paradigmatic, a similar approach could be adopted to ascertain the legitimacy of 
the clauses allowing the user to refuse the acceptance of a performed task, without 
                                                          
100 As the Employment Judge noticed in Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 95. 
101 ALOISI, Commoditized workers, cit., p. 674. 
102 A. ROSENBLAT & L. STARK, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s 
Drivers, in International Journal of Communication, 2016, 10, 3758; PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit 
& Co., cit., p. 626. 
103 A. INGRAO, La funzione dei sistemi di feedback nell’era della economia on demand: un problema di 
subordinazione?, draft paper presented at the 15th International Conference in Commemoration of Professor 
Marco Biagi, Digital and Smart Work, Modena, Marco Biagi Foundation, 20-21 March 2017, courtesy of 
the Author. 
104 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 100. 
105 As depicted by CHERRY, Beyond Misclassification, cit., p. 582. 
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providing payment to the worker106, as well as to question the legitimacy of the 
exclusivity clause that some platforms insert in their general conditions107.  
In the first case special provisions on self-employed work regarding the right to 
receive due compensation may apply. Art. 2227 of the civil code provides the client with 
the right to terminate the self-employment relationship when the task has been partially 
executed, “compensating the worker for the expenses, for the performed work and for his 
loss”. Case law stated that the “loss” under art. 2227 c.c. is constituted by the full price 
of the agreed performance108. The special provision on self-employed “intellectual 
performances” (art. 2237 c.c.) provides the worker with the right to be compensated for 
the expenses and to be paid for the performed work, which will be quantified “with regard 
to the utility deriving to the client”. Under both these regulations, which prohibit 
termination without compensation when the performance is not yet completed, it seems 
that the clause allowing the client to refuse a completed task should be, a fortiori, not 
enforceable under Italian law. 
Even the exclusivity clauses may be deemed unlawful under Italian law. In the 
first place, as they result in “restrictions to the freedom to contract with third parties” they 
certainly require double subscription under art. 1341 c.c.109. In the second place, it could 
be appropriate to consider such clause as vexatious under B2b statutes, and thus void 
under art. 9 L. 128/1998, adopting the same reasoning proposed with regard to the 
remedies against account deactivation. 
It seems therefore possible to address some crucial issues regarding the protection 
of digital workers also through the application of non-employment regulations: the 
general rules of contract law, the specific rules on self-employment and the regulations 
regarding B2b contractual relationships. However, the recourse to civil law principles and 
regulations is still far from being a satisfactory solution, as it presents all the weaknesses 
of an interpretative-only solution and leaves many critical points unsolved. 
3.2. Towards the development of a Statute for self-employed (digital) workers 
An answer to the absence of an exhaustive discipline on pure self-employed work 
comes from the recent Italian Bill AS 2233/AC 4135 (definitively approved by the Senate 
on the 10th of May 2017110) containing “protective provisions on self-employed non-
entrepreneurial work”. 
As it has been underlined, the legislator tried for the first time to construe a 
discipline of self-employed work based on the acknowledgement of its social and ethical 
value, rather than on the prejudice that it hides actual employment relationships111. 
                                                          
106 AMT Participation Agreement, § 3. 
107 DE STEFANO, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”, cit., p. 488, referring to AMT’s and Topcoder’s 
terms and conditions. 
108 Among the most recent decisions, Trib. Monza, 12 January 2016, in De Jure. 
109 Supra, n. 94. 
110 The Bill still has to been published in the Official Bulletin and numbered. 
111 O. RAZZOLINI, Il ddl sul lavoro autonomo: dalla tutela della dipendenza alla tutela della persona, in 
nelmerito.com, 6 May 2016; S. GIUBBONI, Prime osservazioni sul disegno di legge del Governo in materia 
di lavoro autonomo non imprenditoriale, in Massimario di giurisprudenza del lavoro, 2016, n. 4, p. 244. 
Even the relation to the Bill by Senator Sacconi remarks this change of perspective. 
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The Bill introduces several warranties for self-employed workers, ranging from 
the protection against payment delays (art. 2), to tax benefits (art. 8 and 9), to the access 
to formation and collocation services (art. 10) and public procurement (art. 12), to social 
security benefits such as (unpaid) maternity leave, sick leave and injury leave (art. 7, 13 
and 14). 
In the perspective of digital self-employed work, one of the most important 
provisions is set up by art. 3 (4), which explicitly provides for the application to self-
employment relationships of the aforementioned art. 9 L. 192/1998, thus removing the 
uncertainties of interpretative extension. In addition, art. 3 (1) specifies that the clauses 
“granting the client the power to unilaterally modify terms and conditions and, where the 
self-employment relationship is characterised by continuity, to terminate the relationship 
without notice” are vexatious and thus void. 
It is not clear whether the invalidity of the vexatious clause would lead to real 
remedies (such as the re-constitution of the relationship or the disapplication of the 
clause), as the Bill provides that the worker would be entitled to receive reparation for 
damage and loss (art. 3 (3)). However, it seems possible to interpret such provision as 
granting reparation for the damage and loss related to the enforcement of the vexatious 
clause, without excluding the possibility of the restoration of the status quo ante at the 
request of the worker. 
A more specific attempt to regulate the provision of personal services in the gig-
economy is represented by the Bill 3564, containing “provisions on digital platforms for 
the sharing of goods and services and provisions promoting sharing economy” (so-called 
Sharing Economy Act)112. Although the Bill reflects somehow the misunderstanding that 
the gig economy represents an aspect of sharing economy113, and its purpose is mainly to 
promote sharing economy114 – with an eye to the tax increase that may derive from its 
development115 – the Bill contains some provisions which may be extremely relevant for 
the purpose of granting a fair treatment to platform-mediated workers. 
Art. 4 of the Bill provides that the platform owners shall adopt a written policy, 
subject to the Competition Authority’s approval, including the contractual terms and 
conditions between the platform and its users. The Bill provides for a list of clauses 
penalising the “user-operator” (broad label that seems to include also those that we have 
called “digital workers”), which are expressly sanctioned with invalidity. In particular, 
platforms terms and conditions cannot “a) burden the user-operator with any kind of 
exclusive obligation; b) allow the control on the execution of his performance, not even 
through hardware or software systems; c) determine compulsory fees for all users;  d) 
                                                          
112 Proposed on 27 January 2016 and currently pending in the Chamber of Deputies. 
113 Critics to this reconstruction have been made by many commentators: G.M. ECKHARDT & F. BARDHI, 
The Sharing Economy Isn’t about Sharing at All, in hbr.org 28 January 2015; V. MANSHARAMANI, What 
happens when the sharing economy stops sharing and starts owning?, in pbs.org 4 February 2016; A. 
CALLAWAY, Apploitation in a City of Instaserfs: How The "Sharing Economy" Has Turned San Francisco 
into a Dystopia for the Working Class, in Monitor, 2016, vo. 22, n. 5, p. 18.  
114 The Relation to the Bill makes reference to D. WOSSKOW, Unlocking the Sharing Economy. An 
Independent Review, report commissioned by the UK Business Ministry and released in November 2014 
and recommending as to how the UK could become a global centre for this fast-growing sector. 
115 The Relation to the Bill foresees the emersion of 450 million Euros of GDP as of today (producing a 
150 million Euros tax revenue, which could raise to 3 billion by 2025. 
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allow the exclusion of the user-operator from the platform or penalise him in the 
presentation of his offer without serious reasons; […] h) forbid the user operator from 
criticising the owner of the platform” (art. 4 (2)). 
Although the Bill is meant to regulate all kinds of sharing economy activities, 
without a specific labour law focus, the provisions that we have just examined – 
promoting transparency and fairness in the platform’s management – should be welcomed 
as they represent a consistent step forward in filling up that “empty space of law” where 
digital workers seemed to fall. 
4. Conclusions 
The frustrations raising from the difficulty in applying statutory employment law 
to digital workers116 should not lead to the misunderstanding that no protection can be 
found outside that domain. The “lightness” of intermediated self-employed work remains 
“unbearable”, but some attempts to make it heavier may be crowned with success. 
Through the valorisation of contract law principles and regulations, we may 
already be able, at an interpretative level, to address some of the issues raised by platform-
mediated self-employed work. The legislative perspective of implementing new sets of 
rules for “pure” self-employed workers and digital “users-operators” may also give 
further answers to the exigencies of digital workers. 
Some crucial points, however, remain unresolved. In the first place the problem 
of low wages, which represents a constant of platform-mediated work, with workers being 
paid much less than minimum wages set by applicable legislation or collective 
agreements. Two doctrinal proposals in this field deserve to be highlighted, as they move 
from the awareness of the difficulties in reaching reclassification for “digital workers”, 
coherently with the structure that has been adopted in this paper.  
The first proposal117 is to extend the scope of minimum wage provisions provided 
for by law and collective agreement also to self-employed workers, by means of a specific 
intervention (also in the field of European competition law).  
The second proposal118, on the other hand, suggests an interpretative extension to 
(self-employed) platform workers of the principles provided for by Directive 
2008/104/EC on Agency Work, and in particular of the equality principle enshrined in 
art. 5 (1) of the Directive.  
Rebus sic stantibus, however, it seems extremely difficult to address the issue of 
low wages by recurring to the existing instruments of law. The constitutional principle of 
a “proportionate and adequate salary” (art. 36 Italian Constitution) has been repeatedly 
declared inapplicable to self-employed workers119, and the only provision granting an 
                                                          
116 WEISS, Digitalizzazione, cit., p. 662. 
117 MENEGATTI, A fair wage, cit., spec. p. 11 ff.  
118 L. RATTI, Online platforms and crowdwork in Europe: a two-step approach to expanding agency work 
provisions?, forthcoming in Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 2017, vol. 38, issue No. 3. 
119 Corte cost. 7 July 1964, n. 75, in GCost, 1964, p. 751. P. PALAZZO, La prestazione d’opera professionale 
e l’art. 36 della Costituzione, in RTDPC, 1973, p. 1643, underlines the reasoning of the Court that self-
employed workers do not need such a warranty as they do not share the same condition of weakness suffered 
by employees. More recently, Cass. 8 June 2007, n. 13440, in De Jure.  
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“equivalent” wage to quasi-subordinate self-employed workers has been abrogated by the 
Jobs Act reform120.  
Many other issues, moreover, such as the risks of self-exploitation and 
exploitation of child labour121 and the difficulties in pursuing effective collective 
representation for an atomised working force122 cannot find as of today a satisfactory 
solution outside the field of statutory employment law.  
The challenge to avoid “digital work” from bringing to a “nosedive” labour law 
standards, therefore, calls for a political reflection to be conducted both at national and at 
supranational level. 
*** 
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